On December 1, the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of the Treasury (Treasury) published highly-anticipated proposed rules that will significantly impact China’s and other covered nations’ roles in the battery supply chain for electric vehicles (EVs) sold to U.S. consumers. The proposed DOE Interpretive Rules and proposed Treasury Regulations interpret the term “foreign entity of concern” (FEOC) in the same manner for purposes of the Battery Manufacturing and Recycling Grant program under the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the EV credit under section 30D of the Internal Revenue Code introduced by the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). The proposed rules take a more nuanced approach than the proposed and final rules that appeared in the context of the CHIPS and Science Act over the past year (discussed here, here, and here), but nevertheless purport to adopt bright-line rules. As we have previously noted, adopting a different approach to such term in section 30D is justified to balance the IRA’s dual policy goals of onshoring and “friendshoring” the U.S. EV battery supply chain while making credits sufficiently available to accelerate the electrification of the U.S. consumer vehicle fleet.
China
Commerce Final Rule Heightens Uncertainty as to How Treasury Will Interpret “Foreign Entity of Concern” for EV Credits Under Section 30D of the Inflation Reduction Act
By W. Andrew Jack, Daniel B. Levine & Jamin Koo on
Posted in Electric Vehicles, Inflation Reduction Act
On September 22, the Commerce Department published a final rule implementing the national security-related restrictions and obligations on recipients of incentive funds under the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022 (the “CHIPS Act”). The final rule clarifies in some respects, and substantially expands in other respects, the definition of “foreign entity of concern” that appeared in Commerce’s proposed rule, issued in March.
When Commerce issued its proposed rule, the Treasury Department cross-referenced Commerce’s definition of “foreign entity of concern” in Treasury’s concurrently proposed regulations for the CHIPS Act’s tax credit under section 48D of the Internal Revenue Code. We commented at the time that if Treasury were to adopt that same definition for the section 30D electric vehicle (EV) credit under the Inflation Reduction Act (the “IRA”), there could be a significant reduction in the number of vehicles eligible for such credits relative to market expectations. Treasury issued proposed regulations for other aspects of the 30D credit one week after the CHIPS Act guidance, but did not include an interpretation of the term “foreign entity of concern,” and to date has yet to do so (though it has signaled an intent to do so later this year).…
Will Treasury Adopt the Same Interpretation of “Foreign Entity of Concern” for both the Section 48D Credit under the CHIPS Act and the Section 30D Credit under the Inflation Reduction Act?
By W. Andrew Jack, Daniel B. Levine & Jamin Koo on
Posted in Electric Vehicles, Inflation Reduction Act
Background
Later this week the Department of the Treasury is expected to release guidance on the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA)’s EV tax credit under section 30D of the Internal Revenue Code. Highly consequential for the guidance and practical availability of the credit will be how Treasury interprets the term “foreign entity of concern.” This is because Section 30D(d)(7) excludes from credit eligibility vehicles that are:
- placed in service after December 31, 2024, with respect to which any of the applicable critical minerals contained in the battery of such vehicle . . . were extracted, processed, or recycled by a foreign entity of concern; or
- placed in service after December 31, 2023, with respect to which any of the components contained in the battery of such vehicle . . . were manufactured or assembled by a foreign entity of concern.
Meanwhile, last week, Treasury and the Commerce Department released proposed regulations (here and here, respectively) that interpret “foreign entity of concern” for purposes of various incentive programs under the CHIPS & Science Act (CHIPS Act). Because the IRA’s definition of “foreign entity of concern” mirrors the CHIPS Act’s definition of “foreign entity of concern” interpreted by Commerce, and because Treasury cross-referenced Commerce’s interpretation of “foreign entity of concern” in Treasury’s CHIPS Act guidance, it is reasonable to wonder whether Treasury will adopt the same interpretation of “foreign entity of concern” for purposes of the EV credit exclusion in section 30D(d)(7).
If it does, there could be a dramatic diminution of vehicles eligible for the EV credits. Under Treasury’s proposed CHIPS Act regulations, a foreign entity of concern would include, inter alia, (i) any entity organized under the laws of China or having its principal place of business in China, and (ii) any entity organized outside of China 25% or more of whose voting interests are owned by the Chinese government (as in the case of foreign subsidiaries of Chinese state-owned entities (SOEs)). If that interpretation is used for purposes of section 30D, absent a nearly impossibly fast elimination of Chinese critical minerals and battery components from the EV supply chain, the number of vehicles eligible for the 30D EV credit will sharply decrease in 2024 and will be practically eliminated in 2025.
EV manufacturers and suppliers may wish to flag this concern to Treasury.…
Highlights from COP 27: Energy Day
By Thomas Reilly on
Posted in ESG, International Climate Efforts
On November 15th, all eyes were on the G20 Summit where news that the meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi had been broadly positive–including instructions for officials to re-engage on climate change–along with the announcement of funding to help Indonesia move away from reliance on coal-fired energy, served as a welcome boost to the mood in Sharm.…
COP 27: Week One Summary
By Thomas Reilly on
Posted in ESG, International Climate Efforts
COP27 was never going to be a ‘Big COP’ in the way that COP26 in Glasgow was. It was not originally designed to be one of the five-year ratchet reviews of NDCs set out by the 2015 the Paris Agreement and there were no major new climate change texts due to be negotiated. Sharm’s value is likely to be assessed, at least in part, on whether it effectively tees up important items for next year, including:
- the Global Stocktake (the technical dialogue will conclude in June next year, and the political phase at COP28);
- the Global Goal on Adaptation, due to conclude next year;
- the New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance, due to conclude in 2024; and
- the increasingly important future discussions on loss and damage.
However, COP27 remains an important waypoint – not least in how successful it eventually is in avoiding acrimonious debate and significant tensions over loss and damage.…
Highlights from COP 27: Water and Gender Day
By Thomas Reilly on
Posted in ESG, International Climate Efforts
Today, water and gender day, kicked off the second week of COP 27 after a rest day on Sunday.
Normally technical negotiators would hand over negotiations to ministers after the COP weekend to focus on political issues in the second week. However, at this COP, the Egyptian presidency is apparently not planning to bring ministers into negotiations until Wednesday. That would leave very little time to agree on the final texts before the end of COP.…
Continue Reading Highlights from COP 27: Water and Gender Day
Highlights from COP 27: Finance Day
By Thomas Reilly on
Posted in ESG, International Climate Efforts
After the opening two days of COP27 – which were focused on the High Level Segment (HLS) dedicated to Heads of State and Government – today, November 9, was the first day of the ‘main COP’ with the opening of negotiations on official texts and agreements. Reports are that the opening phases of the talks are positive. Appropriately, given tensions earlier this week over financing for loss and damage, today was billed as Finance Day.…
Commerce Requests Factual Information in Solar Circumvention Inquiries on Level of Investment, Non-Financial Barriers, and Research and Development Expenses
On July 14, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) issued a request for a range of additional factual information in connection with the agency’s ongoing circumvention inquiries into solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam that employ inputs from mainland China.[1] The deadline to respond is July 21st.…
President Acts to Prevent Import Tariffs on Solar Cells and Modules from Southeast Asia
Presidential Action Triggered by Crisis in the U.S. Solar Industry
In recent months, the U.S. solar industry has been in the midst of an existential crisis, triggered by the threatened imposition of retroactive and future tariffs on a significant portion of U.S. imports. That crisis began on April 1, 2022, when the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) initiated an inquiry to determine whether solar cells and modules from Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam are circumventing antidumping (“AD”) and countervailing duty (“CVD”) orders on solar cells from China. Solar cells from these countries generally accounted for approximately 80% of U.S. solar module imports in 2020.[1] If Commerce finds circumvention, solar cells and modules from the four target countries could not only be subject to combined AD/CVD tariffs approaching 250%, but Commerce’s regulations also allow for the agency to apply these tariffs retroactively to merchandise entering on or after April 1, 2022 (and potentially as far back as November 4, 2021). This threat of AD/CVD tariffs triggered a steep decrease in imports of solar cells and modules from Southeast Asia, and caused parts of the U.S. solar industry to come to a stand-still, furthering domestic reliance on coal.[2] Given this paralysis in the solar industry, lawmakers and others urged the President to provide relief from potential AD/CVD tariffs.[3]…
The Climate Crisis and China
By Kevin Poloncarz on
Posted in Biden Administration, COP26
This blog is the third in a series, “The ABCs of the AJP.”
An animating principle of President Biden’s American Jobs Plan (AJP) is the urgency to address climate change. But a cross-current is competition with China. This comes through not as subtext, but as the stated purpose. According to the White House, “the President’s plan will unify and mobilize the country to meet the great challenges of our time: the climate crisis and the ambitions of an autocratic China.”…